I think part of that is, had there been different engineers there, it is not so clear that the outcome would have been different, but with different management decisions (e.g. whether to make a new plane or try to pretend it was still the 737) things could have been different.
Was the MCAS a lone example of rushed, poorly tested work done by people without enough knowledge of the industry they were working for? Or is it just the first one to come to light, because the MCAS caused the plane to be grounded before any others did?
We don't know, but my guess is, based on the other news coming out about the 737MAX since it was grounded, that there are other issues like this lurking. This tends to suggest that the problem is cultural, and the corporate culture is one of the primary responsibilities of the people in command.
Was the MCAS a lone example of rushed, poorly tested work done by people without enough knowledge of the industry they were working for? Or is it just the first one to come to light, because the MCAS caused the plane to be grounded before any others did?
We don't know, but my guess is, based on the other news coming out about the 737MAX since it was grounded, that there are other issues like this lurking. This tends to suggest that the problem is cultural, and the corporate culture is one of the primary responsibilities of the people in command.